---
title: "| \\large \\vspace{-1.25cm} Research Article^[I thank Constantin Ruhe, Felix Bethke, Corinne Bara, Neil T.N. Ferguson, Nicole Deitelhoff, Alexandros Tokhi, and UC Berkeley's IR/CP Workshop for useful comments. I also thank the `PanelMatch` team, especially Adam Rauh, for their [very useful responses](https://github.com/insongkim/PanelMatch/issues/132) to my queries about parts of the package, and Hana Attia and Julia Grauvogel for generously granting me access to Version 2.0 of the IST dataset; @attiaInternationalSanctionsTermination2023.]\n|\n| \\Large Re-examining the Effects of Western Sanctions on\n| \\Large Democracy and Human Rights in the 21\\textsuperscript{st} Century\n"
author: 
  - Anton Peez^[Goethe University Frankfurt & Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), [`peez@em.uni-frankfurt.de`](peez@em.uni-frankfurt.de).]
date: 'Version: [30 July 2025](https://osf.io/preprints/osf/ge7at)^[Preprint DOI: [`10.31219/osf.io/ge7at`](https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/ge7at).]'
output:
  bookdown::pdf_document2:
    number_sections: true
    toc: false
    keep_tex: true
documentclass: article
abstract: "Do economic sanctions negatively affect democracy and human rights in targeted countries? Although often intended to improve these outcomes, their record of doing so has historically been mixed at best. Most canonical studies cover the 1980s--1990s, but sanctions practice has since undergone major innovations following debates on humanitarian harm. Given this move towards 'targeted' sanctions, it stands to reason that sanctions may today be achieving their intended purposes. I take up policy and methodological innovations to re-examine the effects of Western sanctions seeking to improve democracy and human rights from 1990--2021. I find that negative effects persist, offering an important update to the empirical literature. Beyond this contribution, I present a template for replicating and extending country-year research in International Relations."
header-includes:
 - \usepackage{float}
 - \pagenumbering{gobble}
 - \usepackage{amsmath}
 - \usepackage{graphicx}
 - \newcommand{\bigCI}{\mathrel{\text{\scalebox{1.07}{$\perp\mkern-10mu\perp$}}}}
 - \usepackage{setspace}
 - \usepackage{sectsty}
 - \sectionfont{\setstretch{1.3}}
 - \subsectionfont{\setstretch{1.3}}
linestretch: 1.5
fontsize: 12pt
bibliography: Biblio-AP.bib
biblio-style: apalike
urlcolor: blue
linkcolor: blue
link-citations: yes
classoption: a4paper
geometry:
- top=1in
- bottom=1in
- left=1in
- right=1in
---

```{r setup, echo=FALSE, include=FALSE}
library(tidyverse)
library(PanelMatch)
library(patchwork)
library(knitr)
library(kableExtra)
#extrafont::loadfonts(quiet=TRUE)
opts_chunk$set(echo=FALSE, message = FALSE, warning = FALSE, results = TRUE, fig.pos = 'H')
read_chunk('02-Full-Script.R')
```

\pagenumbering{roman}
\setstretch{1.00}

**Keywords---**Economic sanctions, democracy, human rights, replication. 

**Word count---**9.236.

\widowpenalty10000
\clubpenalty10000

\setstretch{1.05}

\newpage
\tableofcontents
\newpage

\pagebreak
\pagenumbering{arabic}

\setstretch{2.0}

```{r data-prep}
```

# Introduction {#intro}

Economic sanctions are an increasingly popular foreign policy tool for Western states. As a self-admitted "tool of first resort" for the US [@usdepartmentofthetreasury2021SanctionsReview2021: 1; @dreznerHowNotSanction2022a: 1534], they are used in pursuit of policy aims ranging from curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ending large-scale interstate war to fighting drug trafficking and punishing corruption. A further common aim of Western sanctions is the safeguarding and promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. Authoritarianism and democratic backsliding are on the rise globally: since the early 2010s, slow but steady post-Cold War improvements in liberal and electoral democracy worldwide have reversed [@coppedge2024v].^[See @littleMeasuringDemocraticBacksliding2024 for a more skeptical view.] Meanwhile, human rights are undergoing a related phase of relative stasis [@farissLatentHumanRights2020].

Despite an overall "decline in more overt forms of democracy promotion" [@hydeDemocracyBackslidingInternational2020: 1193], economic sanctions remain one of only a few coercive tools immediately available to Western policymakers in the face of coups, electoral fraud, or egregious human rights violations. From the 1990s onwards, an increasing share of Western sanctions has nominally aimed to improve democracy and human rights, with a renewed increase in the late 2000s [@felbermayrGlobalSanctionsData2020a: 10--11, 21]. This study examines this type of sanctions, sometimes called "democratic sanctions" [@coxDemocraticSanctionsConnecting2006; @vonsoestAreDemocraticSanctions2015a]. Appendix \@ref(app-decline) illustrates these trends in declining democracy and human rights and the increase in "democratic sanctions."

Much of the canonical sanctions literature has found that economic sanctions negatively affect democracy and human rights outcomes in targeted countries, including those explicitly intended to *improve* democracy and human rights [e.g., @peksenCoerciveCorrosiveNegative2010; @dizajiPotentialEarlyPhase2013; @wallaceRegimeTypeIssues2013]. Increases in repression are argued to be caused by diminished fiscal capacity leading to less oversight of the security apparatus, poorer government services, and increased corruption. Furthermore, sanctions may cause economic conditions to deteriorate, leading to protest, which in turn may be brutally repressed [@grauvogelSanctionsSignalsHow2017; @liouRevisitingCausalLinks2020a]. However, the timeframes examined in this literature largely consist of the 1980s and 1990s.

Meanwhile, sanctions policy has undergone significant changes since the 1990s, with a major shift from indiscriminate embargoes to sanctions that target specific economic sectors and high-ranking regime officials [e.g., @dreznerSanctionsSometimesSmart2011; @dreznerEconomicSanctionsTheory2018]. Given these policy innovations, there are reasons to expect a reduction in the negative effects of sanctions on ordinary citizens. Nonetheless, while targeting reforms have reduced "the significant humanitarian costs of the blunt instrument of comprehensive sanctions," an assumption persists that targeted sanctions "are not necessarily more effective in achieving their purposes" [@bierstekerTargetedSanctionsImpacts2016a: 1--2]. This article therefore re-examines the question of whether Western-supported democracy- and human rights-related sanctions today facilitate the intended improvements in the targeted country, or whether they continue to negatively affect the outcomes they seek to improve. As sanctions gain further popularity, this is a highly policy-relevant question.

Major changes in sanctions policy, novel data, and methodological innovations in international relations (IR) and political science make a close re-examination of this question worthwhile. This article uses new datasets for all major variables, taking up recent conceptual improvements and significantly extending past country-year sanctions research temporally. I apply new causal inference tools for panel data as a way to evaluate policy, estimate longer-run effects, and overcome the main observable biases on treatment selection. In doing so, I present a framework for replicating and extending country-year research in IR.

The results show that the negative effects of sanctions on democracy persist in the late 20^th^ and early 21^st^ century, from 1990--2021. Results for human rights outcomes are mixed, but also show negative trends. These results are robust to various specifications. This suggests that despite greater sophistication, the move towards 'targeted' Western sanctions has -- on the whole -- likely not had the desired effects of minimizing civilian harm. Even if we consider sanctions as a "least bad choice" in times of crisis abroad [@peksenPoliticalEffectivenessNegative2019], Western decisionmakers do not seem to have solved the major problem of humanitarian fallout. Imposing targeted sanctions to support democracy and human rights abroad remains ethically fraught [@earlyStillUnjustJust2018]. Policymakers should therefore devote further attention to sanctions design, implementation, and enforcement, and consider alternative policy tools under a principle of 'do no harm.'






# Sanctions and sanctions research in the 21^st^ century {#review}

The main contributions of this article are empirical, largely following the approach of "holding theory constant" while applying insights from causal inference methods [@samiiCausalEmpiricismQuantitative2016: 950]. "New theories are necessary only when sufficient evidence demands them" [@besbrisLessTheoryMore2017: 148], and the effects of sanctions on democracy and human rights can be usefully examined using extant theoretical and conceptual frameworks.^[That said, Drezner [-@dreznerEconomicSanctionsTheory2018: 252] points out a lack of pure theory in sanctions research.]




## The effect of sanctions on democracy and human rights {#eff}

Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Lit) summarizes canonical quantitative studies on the domestic consequences of economic sanctions and plots the timeframes they examine. This is further discussed in Appendix \@ref(app-lit). Most country-year studies show a general worsening of democracy and human rights in sanctioned countries, while a small handful show improvements. However, expert assessments of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions threats and impositions often paint a more optimistic picture, with success rates well above 50% (see Appendices \@ref(app-threats) and \@ref(app-success) on threats and impositions).

The majority of research -- and therefore much of the conventional wisdom -- mainly covers the years of the Cold War era and 1990s, mostly running through 2000/2005 due to the coverage of the influential HSE and TIES datasets (see \@ref(new-data)). Therefore, studies focusing on the years after 1990 and especially 2005 onwards will be instructive for probing contemporary sanctions practice and effectiveness, and whether the move towards more sophisticated 'targeted' sanctions has delivered on its intentions. Given the significant investment, high political will, and wide-ranging scholarly input in this reform process (see \@ref(changes)), it stands to reason that these innovations have indeed resulted in better sanctioning practice. Greater precision in sanctions tools entails greater pressure on targets, which -- in the logic of the 1990s/2000s reforms -- should lead to greater effectiveness and less unintended democracy- and human rights-related fallout. Though past work finds negative effects via various pathways (see Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Lit) and Section \@ref(conclusion)), I test sanctions effectiveness 'naively' as a matter of policy evaluation [@atheyStateAppliedEconometrics2017; @liouRevisitingCausalLinks2020a: 809, 816]. I expect that the major policy shifts surrounding targeted sanctions since the 1990s have had the desired effect of bringing about positive changes in sanctioned countries with respect to democracy and human rights.

> **H1:** Democracy- and human rights-related sanctions imposition causes an improvement of democracy.

> **H2:** Democracy- and human rights-related sanctions imposition causes an improvement of human rights.

\pagebreak

```{r Tab-Lit}
```

\pagebreak



## Changes to sanctions policy and world politics {#changes}

The drastic humanitarian consequences of the comprehensive UN trade embargo on Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the 1990s prompted UN, US, and EU decisionmakers to shift their sanctions policy from broad blockades to sanctions targeted at political elites (e.g., asset freezes) or particular economic sectors (e.g., oil) [@bierstekerThinkingUnitedNations2016a: 25--27; @earlyStillUnjustJust2018: 61--62].^['Targeted sanctions' are here defined as all sanctions that are not comprehensive embargoes; @bierstekerThinkingUnitedNations2016a: 27.] Major policy consultations included the "Interlaken Process" on financial sanctions (1998--99/2001), the "Bonn–Berlin Process" on arms, aviation, and travel sanctions (1999--2000/01), and the "Stockholm Process" on sanctions enforcement (2001--02/03) [@bierstekerTargetedSanctionsImpacts2016a: 3]. Giumelli dates the change to 'targeted sanctions' at the UN to the mid-1990s [-@giumelliUnderstandingUnitedNations2015: 1352], Hawkins and Lloyd find that the normative shift had gained "substantial support" by the early 2000s [-@hawkinsQuestioningComprehensiveSanctions2003: 441, 451--452], and Drezner summarizes that the UN and the US had fully "internalized" the notion of targeted sanctions by 2010 [-@dreznerSanctionsSometimesSmart2011: 99--101]. Thus, if we roughly date the shift towards targeted sanctions to around 2005, the late 2000s, 2010s, and 2020s are critical for assessing the effects of these changes. If they were successful, we would expect to see positive (or at least less negative) domestic outcomes from the mid-2000s onwards.

Panel A in Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-02) illustrates the increasing precision of UN, EU, and US economic sanctions since the 1990s and the mid-2000s as the starting point for targeted sanctions [@attiaInternationalSanctionsTermination2023]. Panel B shows an increase in post-Cold War sanctioning, a slight decrease around the late 1990s reconsideration towards targeted sanctions, and a slow increase that has taken up speed since 2015 [@felbermayrGlobalSanctionsData2020a; @attiaInternationalSanctionsTermination2023]. While only around 25% of sanctioned countries in the early to mid-1990s were subject to asset freezes and travel bans against political elites -- two particularly prominent types of targeted sanctions -- this has risen to about 60% in the 2020s. Conversely, one quarter of all sanctioned countries were sanctioned comprehensively in the early 1990s, but this has halved to 12%, and these are not full blockades, but rather highly restrictive unilateral sanctions.^[In 2021, the targets were North Korea (US), Iran (US), Cuba (US), Syria (US), Sudan (US), and the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine (US, EU); @attiaInternationalSanctionsTermination2023.]

Alongside these changes in sanctions policy, broader shifts in world politics also make this re-examination worthwhile. For instance, the US and the EU have increasingly "weaponized interdependence," using their central positions in global financial and informational networks for strategic leverage over other states [@farrellWeaponizedInterdependenceHow2019]. This has changed the coercive capacity and reach of Western sanctions, potentially also affecting their consequences in sanctioned states.

```{r Fig-02, fig.cap="Trends in Western sanctions, 1989--2021.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=8.1, fig.height=5.55}
```







## New data on sanctions, democracy, and human rights {#new-data}

Many of the canonical quantitative studies on sanctions cover the late Cold War era through 2005, often using the influential TIES dataset [1945--2005, @morganThreatImpositionEconomic2014, see Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Lit) and Appendix \@ref(app-lit)]. Only recently have datasets with more up-to-date coverage been published: EUSANCT [1989--2015, @weberPostColdWarSanctioning2022a], IST [1990--2018/2021, @attiaInternationalSanctionsTermination2023], and the GSDB [1950--2021, @felbermayrGlobalSanctionsData2020a]. The former covers sanctions threats and impositions, the latter two cover imposed sanctions. This article uses IST for its main analyses and EUSANCT for supplementary analyses and illustrations. IST has good temporal coverage (Version 2.0; 1990--2021), and focuses on key sanctions senders and aims I am particularly interested in -- the UN, US, and EU's support of democracy and human rights abroad. In addition to coverage, IST's detailed and transparent sourcing and coding make it the most reliable reference work on Western sanctions in particular.

Significant data improvements have also been made in the study of democracy and human rights through human-coded datasets [@weidmannRecentEventsCoding2024: 923--924]. While the classic studies on sanctions largely use Polity IV or Freedom House data to measure democracy and autocracy [see Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Lit) and Appendix \@ref(app-lit), @marshallPolityIV180019992002, @house2022freedom], V-Dem now provides more detailed measures [@boeseHowNotMeasure2019]. Similarly, sanctions studies most commonly used CIRI or PTS human rights data [@cingranelli2010cingranelli; @woodPoliticalTerrorScale2010], which can now be compared to Human Rights Scores (HRS) as a "theoretically informed measurement model" with greater coverage [@farissRespectHumanRights2014a: 297, 301].







## New tools for causal inference with country-year data in IR {#ci}

The imposition of economic sanctions is a clear and easily identifiable policy intervention. Therefore, it can be usefully examined with causal inference methods designed for policy evaluation [@atheyStateAppliedEconometrics2017]. Given the country-year data at hand, matching and weighting, combined with difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation, are a useful, applicable methodological approach that is here implemented via `PanelMatch` [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023]. This 'selection on observables' identification strategy draws upon past work on the treatment assignment mechanism of economic sanctions, i.e., the factors determining sanctions imposition [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a; @lichtHazardsHasslesEffect2017]. Although a recognized challenge, potential endogeneity and confounding are often not explicitly tackled in sanctions research, as convincingly argued by Licht [-@lichtHazardsHasslesEffect2017: 162] and by Gutmann and colleagues [-@gutmannPrecisionguidedBluntEffects2020: 160].

For the case of sanctions research, matching has attractive properties compared to country-year regression because it explicitly focuses on and makes claims about the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT); the effect of sanctions on countries that typically get sanctioned [see @samiiCausalEmpiricismQuantitative2016]. That said, selection on observables remains a weaker identification strategy than designs building upon random or quasi-random treatment assignment [@keeleStatisticsCausalInference2015; @doleacEvidencebasedPolicyShould2019]. Within the predominant country-year framework for sanctions research, such designs remain largely out of reach [see @demena2021publication]. Nonetheless, matching and weighting are useful alternatives to the prevailing approaches [see @lichtHazardsHasslesEffect2017; @gutmannPrecisionguidedBluntEffects2020]. This study therefore presents a faithful application of @imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023 to the question of economic sanctions aiming to improve democracy and human rights.





## Framework: replication, extension {#rep}

Examining the causal effects of sanctions on domestic conditions in the sanctioned country is a highly policy relevant research question, and comparatively straightforward conceptually. Nonetheless, there are many plausible ways of answering the same empirical research question, even when using identical data [@silberzahnCrowdsourcedResearchMany2015; @breznauObservingManyResearchers2022]. Considering the "researcher degrees of freedom" and "garden of forking paths" inherent in social inquiry [@gelman2013garden], this article closely builds on and replicates previous work on the subject [see @gleditschReplicationInternationalRelations2016]. It uses and extends one article in particular, @vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a. Their article examines the 'treatment assignment mechanism' for democracy- and human rights-related sanctions and is therefore a well-suited building block for estimating subsequent causal effects.^[See @lichtHazardsHasslesEffect2017 for a similar approach.]









# Outcome, treatment, and estimand {#definitions}

## Outcomes: democracy and human rights measures {#outcome}

This study's main research interest is whether Western sanctions cause an improvement of human rights and democracy in the countries they target. Appendix \@ref(app-stats) presents summary statistics for these and all other variables used in this article.

The state of _democracy_ is here defined with a narrow focus on its electoral dimension ('polyarchy'), understood as a "minimalist" definition [@coppedgeVDemCodebookV102020: 42--44; @przeworskiDemocracyMarketPolitical1991; @dahlDemocracy1998; @kurkiDemocracyConceptualContestability2010a]. Electoral democracy reflects "the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition" under fair conditions, free civil society participation, and sound electoral organization. Democracy-related sanctions are often threatened and imposed following anti-democratic coups to return to constitutional order or after fraudulent elections to bring about fairly-run ones. An emphasis on this electoral dimension examines the shorter-term changes and improvements sanctions senders hope to achieve, as opposed to slower-moving societal aspects of democracy such as egalitarianism and liberal values [@coppedgeVDemCodebookV102020: 45; @lindbergVDemNewWay2014: 158, 160--161]. Although a significant innovation in the measurement of democracy, V-Dem is not widely used in sanctions research.^[Appendix \@ref(app-lit); for an exception, see @hellmeierHowForeignPressure2021.]

_Human rights_ are here narrowly defined as the degree to which government agents violate or uphold the physical integrity rights of their population. This covers the absence or presence of extreme repressive practices such as arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and execution [@farissRespectHumanRights2014a: 297; see also @poeRepressionHumanRights1994; @richardsRespectPhysicalIntegrityRights2015]. This definition emphasizes the violation or safeguarding of immediate physical safety, reflecting the conditions that human rights-related sanctions most commonly intend to improve. Narrow definitions of this sort focusing on physical integrity rights are commonly used in cross-sectional work on human rights conditions [@cordellDisaggregatingRepressionIdentifying2022: 6]. It is usually argued that physical integrity rights are the foundation of all other human rights, and measures of both therefore closely correlate [@cope2018beyond].



## Treatment: democracy- and human rights-related sanctions imposition {#treatment}

The treatment is the imposition of democracy- or human rights-related sanctions, sometimes called "democratic sanctions" [@coxDemocraticSanctionsConnecting2006; @vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a: 18; @vonsoestAreDemocraticSanctions2015a]. The relevant literature often bundles these two objectives of sanctions because they are conceptually related and often imposed simultaneously. Appendix \@ref(app-dem-hr) lays out how these sanctions goals coincide.^[Among 870 country-years facing either type of sanctions objective from 1990--2021, 62.2% faced both (542 of 870).]

The binary treatment measure is whether a given country was sanctioned by the UN, US, and/or the EU in a given year. Among sanctions datasets, IST (International Sanctions Termination) is best suited for studying the research questions of this paper [@attiaInternationalSanctionsTermination2023; @portelaEvolutionDatabasesAge2022]: it covers sanctions from 1990--2021 and provides detailed information on sanctions objectives. As we are interested in Western sanctions policy surrounding democracy and human rights, the sender coverage is also appropriate. This simplification of sanctions imposition as a binary variable -- despite the fact that sanctions in fact vary in intensity and 'treatment dosage' -- should be revisited in future work.^[`PanelMatch` currently does not offer an analysis of varying treatment dosages, i.e., a continuous treatment.]

This study focuses on sanctions imposed and supported by Western states [see also @vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a; @pospiesznaAmplifyingNullifyingImpact2020]. Western states are the most active sanctioners, data coverage for Western senders is plausibly complete,^[The main sanctions datasets are largely sourced from news archives, which most reliably cover English-language and Western sources.] and sanctions goals and mechanisms are fairly similar across Western states, making generalizations justifiable. Studies of this type typically only cover sanctions threatened and imposed by the US and/or the EU/EEC (Appendix \@ref(app-lit)). In contrast, this study adds UN sanctions to the analysis. The common exclusion of UN sanctions from 'Western' sanctions overlooks that UN sanctions require the support of three key Western states as members of the Security Council: the US, UK, and France (the "P3"). Indeed, given the considerable normative power of UNSC resolutions and these sanctions' binding nature in accordance with the UN Charter, the P3 often push for multilateral UN measures while also imposing their own. Therefore, I argue that UN sanctions are by definition "Western-supported" sanctions, and should therefore be included in these types of analyses.^[The results hold regardless of whether UN sanctions are included or not, see Appendix \@ref(app-un-sanc).]

Given this definition, Appendix \@ref(app-treat-var) examines treatment variation from 1990--2021. Overall, 'democratic sanctions' onset is somewhat rare [see also @beiser-mcgrathSeparationRareEvents2022: 432--435]: The timeframe contains 86 cases of onset, or about 3 instances per year on average. 68 of 181 country units (38%) had Western democracy- or human rights-related sanctions imposed on them at some point in the examined timeframe. There are no strong temporal clusters. Therefore, there is enough variation in treatment across time and units, strengthening the internal and external validity of the analysis [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023: 591--592].

Sanctions _threats_ are often overlooked in the sanctions literature, although their implicit or explicit threat already significantly affects government behavior [@dreznerHiddenHandEconomic2003]. This concern is less relevant for the issue at hand, as explicit threats of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions only rarely result in target acquiescence. This is likely because concessions on democracy represent a major risk to an autocrat's hold on power [@vonsoestAreDemocraticSanctions2015a: 961--962]. Appendix \@ref(app-threats) illustrates this for threats over the 1989--2015 timeframe.^[Only 11.7% of such threats were effective from 1989--2015, compared to 45% of sanctions threats in pursuit of other objectives.] Therefore, this paper focuses on imposed sanctions only.







## Estimand: ATT {#estimand}

The estimand is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): the average effect of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions onset on democracy and human rights in sanctioned countries.

The assumption for estimating the ATT is $Y^0 \bigCI D | X$ -- i.e., that the distribution of outcomes for untreated units is the same for both (matched and weighted) control units and (counterfactually) treated units. For the case of sanctions, this assumption means that, once appropriately matched and weighted, human rights and democracy would on average have developed similarly in sanctioned countries as they did in unsanctioned countries if the former had not been sanctioned. In other words, in the absence of sanctions, the trajectories of sanctioned countries would have developed in parallel to those of unsanctioned countries similar to them on key observable characteristics. This latter group's observed outcomes are thus used to interpolate the former's potential outcomes [see @cunninghamMatchingVsRegression2023; @morganCounterfactualsCausalInference2015: 37--76; @blackwellHowMakeCausal2018: 1068--1069]. Following Imai, Kim, and Wang (`PanelMatch`), the ATT is estimated as follows [-@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023: 592--593], separately for democracy and human rights:

\begin{equation}(\#eq:model)
  \begin{aligned}
    \delta(F, L) = \mathbb{E}[& Y_{i, t+F}(X_{it} = 1, X_{i, t-1} = 0, [X_{i, t-\ell}]_{\ell=2}^L) - \\
                              & Y_{i, t+F}(X_{it} = 0, X_{i, t-1} = 0, [X_{i, t-\ell}]_{\ell=2}^L) | X_{it} = 1, X_{i, t-1} = 0]
  \end{aligned}
\end{equation}

The estimated ATT is the observed difference $\delta$ in outcomes between treated and untreated units $X_{it} = 1$ and $X_{it} = 0$, after both had previously been untreated $X_{i, t-1} = 0$. The ATT can be estimated for different specified timeframes. _F_ and _L_ represent leads and lags, respectively, i.e., the timeframe after treatment for which the ATT is estimated (_t+0_, _t+1_, _t+2_...) and the past timeframes based on which matches are created (..._t--2_, _t--1_). In Equation \@ref(eq:model), the potential outcome of treated units is shown in line one and that of untreated units is shown in the first part of line two [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023: 593]. This follows common potential outcomes notation [@morganCounterfactualsCausalInference2015]. This framework can be readily applied to study and re-examine the effects of economic sanctions on democracy and human rights in targeted countries.^[Likewise using country-year data, Imai, Kim, and Wang [-@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023] use it to re-examine (1) the effects of democratization on economic growth and (2) whether war mobilization increases inheritance tax rates.]









# Treatment assignment: Who is sanctioned when? {#treatment-assign}

Economic sanctions are imposed strategically, and the logic behind the approach used in the following is the creation of treatment and control groups of countries that face similar *ex ante* risks of sanctions imposition and have similar trends in electoral democracy and human rights [@lichtHazardsHasslesEffect2017: 160]. This article builds on past work by von Soest and Wahman [-@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a] examining dramatic events such as coups and fraudulent elections as key triggers for Western sanctions imposition. Adopting a potential outcomes approach, these types of trigger events are an important part of the treatment assignment mechanism. However, this critical role and the predictive capacity of trigger events for sanctions imposition has been overlooked in sanctions scholarship using matching techniques [e.g., @gutmannPrecisionguidedBluntEffects2020; @earlyDoesMiseryLove2022]. Besides trigger events and in line with past work [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a], this section also examines target vulnerability and sender--target relations as likely determinants of sanctions imposition by the UN, EU, and US. The following subsections lay out these and other confounders used in the subsequent analysis.





## Trigger events {#confound-a}

_Coups_ -- Successful coups often cause violence and disorder. Anti-democratic coups in particular are frequently met with international condemnation, including sanctions imposition [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a]. Coup data is drawn from the recent update of the Colpus dataset [@chinVarietiesCoupsDetat2021; @chinAfricanCoupsCOVID192023].

_Controversial elections_ -- Sanctions are also frequently imposed when Western monitors raise fraud allegations, are denied participation, or refuse to monitor an election [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a: 23]. This data is taken from V-Dem and NELDA [@hydeWhichElectionsCan2012a; @coppedge2024v].

These two critical 'trigger events' variables are generally not lagged in the relevant literature because empirically they almost always precede sanctions imposition, ruling out reverse causality [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a: 23, fn8].




## Target vulnerability and sender--target relations {#confound-b}

Beyond immediate, drastic trigger events, the target's vulnerability to external coercion and its extant links to Western states also affect the likelihood of Western sanctions imposition [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a].

_Target vulnerability and instability_ -- Pro-democracy protests may be interpreted by Western senders as target vulnerability, and may encourage them to impose targeted sanctions to support protesters [@grauvogelSanctionsSignalsHow2017]. This information is drawn from V-Dem's indicators for civil soviety repression and pro-democracy protest [@coppedge2024v]. Meanwhile, economic weakness -- e.g., stagnating growth or rising inflation -- may imply a vulnerable target and encourage imposition. I use World Bank data on GDP, GDP per capita, economic growth, and inflation [@arel-bundockWDIWorldDevelopment2022].

_Intrastate conflict_ -- An increase in intrastate conflict may also make the imposition of human rights-related sanctions and arms embargoes more likely, while causing a deterioration in the outcomes of interest. This is measured by whether there is an increase in the number of ongoing intrastate conflicts in a given year [@ucdp/prioUCDPPRIOArmed2024].

_Neo-patrimonialism_ -- The turn towards 'targeted' sanctions took up the insight that certain regime types may be more pliable with sanctions than others -- namely, personalist systems highly dependent on 'buying off' domestic elites and rivals. Neo-patrimonial states offer clear openings for targeted sanctions and asset freezes [@escriba-folchDealingTyrannyInternational2010; @peksenWhenImposedEconomic2019]. This is operationalized with V-Dem's 'neo-patrimonialism' variable [@coppedge2024v].

_Political proximity_ -- Finally, UN General Assembly voting proximity to the US and EU members [@baileyEstimatingDynamicState2017] also affects Western sanctions imposition [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a]. Potential sanctions senders consider proximity and vulnerability strategically: sanctions are most likely against allied states when those allies are stable, and against adversaries when those adversaries are unstable. Conversely, sanctions are less likely against politically unstable allies and against stable adversaries [@mcleanPoliticalRelationsLeader2018].










## Predicting 'democratic sanctions' imposition {#predict}

Von Soest and Wahman's original results could be successfully reproduced moving from their original `Stata` code to `R`. The results also hold when replicated for the 1990--2021 timeframe with the newer datasets summarized above. Appendix \@ref(app-repli) presents these replications.^[See @gleditschReplicationInternationalRelations2016 on reproduction and replication in IR.] While coups are quite regularly met with sanctions imposition, fraudulent elections are today sanctioned more rarely than they once were. Nonetheless, both remain an important predictor of sanctions onset (Appendix \@ref(app-trig-desc)).

Based on von Soest and Wahman's original approach and taking up the variables outlined in Sections \@ref(outcome), \@ref(treatment), \@ref(confound-a), and \@ref(confound-b), Table \@ref(tab:Tab-04) shows three rare events logit models predicting the onset of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions by the UN, EU, and US from 1990--2021. Model 1 contains a larger range of potentially relevant factors derived from the literature. Model 2 drops the variables found to be statistically insignificant to predicting sanctions onset. The effects of the remaining variables are largely retained. Finally, Model 3 combines the two ‘trigger events’ variables. These trigger events are rare individually (Appendix \@ref(app-trig-desc)) -- e.g., there are only a small handful of successful coups in any given year -- making exact annual matching difficult. Combining coups and fraudulent elections assumes that they function similarly as "triggers" for sanctions imposition [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a]. Model 3 shows that this trigger events count performs similarly to the individual variables. Appendix \@ref(app-trade) considers whether trade might be a relevant confounder, which it does not appear to be.

```{r Tab-04}
```

The upshot of this theoretical and empirical examination of the treatment assignment mechanism is that four main characteristics determine the imposition and non-imposition of UN, EU, and US sanctions intended to improve democracy and human rights:

1. major trigger events (coups, fraudulent elections),
2. pro-democracy protests in the target country,
3. political proximity between sender and target, and
4. increases in intrastate war.

This supports previous findings and adds further insights on how senders might consider domestic opposition and protest [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a; @grauvogelSanctionsSignalsHow2017]. These four confounders will therefore be used to match and weight sanctioned and unsanctioned country-years in the main analysis.









# Results: Do sanctions still hurt democracy and human rights? {#results}

Having established four key predictors for 'democratic sanctions' imposition, this section estimates their effects on democracy and human rights. These four predictors are also potential confounders, meaning they potentially affect both sanctions imposition _and_ democracy and human rights outcomes at time _t_ and onwards. The effect of sanctions on domestic outcomes is calculated by matching, weighting, and difference-in-differences estimation (DiD) via `PanelMatch` [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023].




## Matching {#matching}

Having mapped all observations and their treatment variation (see above and Appendix \@ref(app-treat-var)), treated and untreated countries in a given year _t_ are matched. Treated observations -- countries with 'democratic sanctions' onset in a given year -- are matched with countries in the same year that have an identical treatment history for a specified lag period $L$, but were not sanctioned at _t_. Treatment history is a potential confounder for the present analysis [see also @blackwellHowMakeCausal2018: 1069]: governments previously sanctioned may react to new sanctions imposition differently than those who have not experienced them in the recent past. This includes learning effects regarding issues such as sanctions evasion, 'sanctions-proofing' the domestic economy, and strengthening relations with 'black knight' actors [@cilizogluEconomicCoercionProblem2020]. Matching exactly on the time period also alleviates concerns around the effects of world events such as the end of the Cold War or the 2007--09 recession going unrecognized [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023: 594--595]. Within these "matched sets," the single sanctioned country acts as the treated unit and all remaining unsanctioned countries as the control group. Applying this procedure with a lag time of $L = 4$ and a lead time of $F = 3$ provides a total of $n = 60$ matched sets from which estimates are derived (out of a total of $N = 86$ cases of 'democratic sanctions' onset in the examined timeframe). Appendix \@ref(app-list) lists the 60 observations included in the main analysis and the 26 that are dropped.^[Note that there are concerns around samples of roughly this size; @egerodHowManyEnough2024. However, @imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023 themselves use similar sample sizes, at $n = 26$ and $n = 103$ matched sets. This limits the types of subsample analyses that can be conducted.] The estimates are robust to different lead and lag specifications.





## Weighting and balance {#balance}

As matches are simply made on treatment history, the matched sets contain many control units very different from the treated unit. The next step therefore weights the observations in accordance with theoretical expectations and past empirical work regarding confounders (see Section \@ref(treatment-assign)). The aim is to refine the matched sets and construct very similar treatment and control groups. From a methodological and epistemological perspective, this is similar to Mill's Most Similar Systems Design [@plumperCaseSelectionCausal2019: 5, 15--16]. It is also preferable to the often idiosyncratic "effective samples" produced by regular time-series regression because it is theory-driven and explicit in its weighting criteria [@samiiCausalEmpiricismQuantitative2016].

The confounders on which control units will be weighted are drawn from the above analysis of the treatment assignment mechanism (Section \@ref(treatment-assign)). Unsanctioned countries that are very similar to sanctioned countries on the four key factors identified above are assigned greater weight: domestic trigger events, pro-democracy protest, political proximity to the EU and US, and civil conflict. Appendix \@ref(app-illu) illustrates the matching and weighting procedure for an example case, the 2015 imposition of EU and US sanctions on Burundi following a power grab by incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza and subsequent violence against anti-government protesters. It shows that the procedure acts as we expect it to, assigning the most weight to countries similar on the four identified predictors of sanctions imposition (e.g., Ethiopia, Nigeria, Azerbaijan) and very little weight to very different countries (e.g., Norway, Georgia, Iceland).

Summarizing all matched sets contained in the analysis, Table \@ref(tab:Tab-balance) displays the balance between treatment and control groups on the four main confounders, using covariate balancing propensity score weighting (CBPS). The corresponding model is fitted to all observations in the treated and control groups in the entire timeframe, producing robust estimates [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023: 595--596].

The variables for trigger events (coups and controversial elections) and civil war onset are balanced and weighted from $t_{-4}$ through $t_{0}$ (i.e., not through $t_{-1}$). As von Soest and Wahman show, these events virtually always occur _before_ sanctions imposition (hence 'trigger events'), and their measurement at $t_{0}$ is therefore generally not post-treatment in practice [@vonsoestNotAllDictators2015a: 23 n8]. All other variables are examined from $t_{-4}$ through $t_{-1}$ to rule out post-treatment bias. As shown in Table \@ref(tab:Tab-balance), after weighting, sufficient balance between treated and control groups is achieved, using a threshold of <|0.25|, <|0.2|, or <|0.1| standardized mean differences for all variables [@stuartMatchingMethodsCausal2010: 11, 15; @lindenUsingBalanceStatistics2013: 969; @rubinUsingPropensityScores2001: 177; @imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023; @greiferCobaltCovariateBalance2021].





## Difference-in-differences estimation of the causal effect {#did}

Finally, the ATT is estimated using the above matches, weights, and parameters using DiD estimation. DiD estimation is intended to account for unobserved, time-invariant confounding factors and differences between the treatment and control groups. Figures \@ref(fig:Fig-DM) and \@ref(fig:Fig-HR) illustrate the estimated results for the two outcomes of interest. Parallel trends can also be inspected in these plots. The effect of treatment on outcome -- of 'democratic sanctions' imposition on democracy and human rights -- is estimated from $t$ through $t_{+3}$. The pre-treatment trends are estimated with a placebo test.^[I thank the `PanelMatch` team for answering a query about extracting standard errors and confidence intervals from `PanelMatch`;  [`https://github.com/insongkim/PanelMatch/issues/132`](https://github.com/insongkim/PanelMatch/issues/132).]

_First_, for electoral _democracy_, democratic sanctions imposition is estimated to have a negative contemporaneous ($t_{0}$) causal effect of about --0.06 [95% CIs: --0.09; --0.03] on a 0--1 scale, further dipping to --0.08 [--0.13; --0.04] at $t_{+1}$ and --0.07 [--0.10; --0.03] in $t_{+2}$ (Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-DM)). This suggests a notable negative effect of sanctions on democracy in the targeted country. Put into contemporary terms for 2022, these differences roughly amount to those between Norway and the UK (0.899 and 0.843), Ghana and Sri Lanka (0.633 and 0.575), Uzbekistan and Vietnam (0.221 and 0.157), or the year before and after Viktor Orbán was elected president of Hungary (2009: 0.854, 2010: 0.805).^[2021: 0.455.]

_Second_, the imposition of democratic sanctions is also estimated to have a negative contemporaneous effect ($t_{0}$) on _human rights_ (Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-HR)), at --0.26 [--0.41; --0.12] on a --3.5--5.5 scale. The estimates remain negative in $t_{+1}$ (--0.22 [--0.39; --0.05]) and $t_{+2}$ (--0.19 [--0.36; --0.06]), before the confidence interval cross zero in $t_{+3}$ (--0.18 [--0.37; 0.02]). For 2021, a difference in the range of --0.26 roughly amounts to the differences between Germany and Taiwan (3.61 and 3.39), Romania and Hungary (1.60 and 1.40), or China and Mali (--1.71 and --1.93). However, pre-treatment trends are not entirely parallel, so these results are less reliable than those for democracy. This uncertainty compared to the results for democracy may result from how the outcome measures are constructed, ultimately being based on aggregated human coding. While coups and fraudulent elections are clearly observable events, deteriorating human rights conditions are often more subtle. This makes them more difficult to measure and subject to greater uncertainty.^[I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this.]

Substantively, these negative estimates are more similar to the "corrosive" effects Peksen and Drury find for sanctions from 1972--2000 [-@peksenCoerciveCorrosiveNegative2010: 255--256] than the positive effects Wahman and von Soest find for democracy-related sanctions from 1990--2010 [-@vonsoestAreDemocraticSanctions2015a]. Even when "signing the bias" [@buenodemesquitaThinkingClearlyData2021: 176--179], the effects are normatively concerning: While the treated group still experiences slightly more trigger events despite the weighting procedure and therefore the effects may be slightly overestimated, better balance would likely not fully remove the negative effects. That said, it is again worth highlighting the effect estimated here. This analysis examines a certain type of sanctioned country: states faced with 'democratic sanctions,' but not so extreme and long-term as to have been sanctioned for virtually the entire post-Cold War era. Appendix \@ref(app-list) discusses this sample and type of country.

\pagebreak

```{r Fig-DM, fig.cap="Estimated effect of democratic sanctions on democracy, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.8}
```

```{r Fig-HR, fig.cap="Estimated effect of democratic sanctions on human rights, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.8}
```

```{r Tab-balance}
```

\pagebreak






## Robustness checks and sub-sample analyses {#robust}

I test these main results in supplementary analyses. *First*, I conduct placebo tests to probe the mechanism driving these negative effects. This uses states sanctioned for reasons *un*related to democracy and human rights as the treatment group (e.g., sanctions imposed due to corruption, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, etc.). Appendix \@ref(app-placebo) describes and presents these tests. In these exploratory models, there seems to be no strong effect on democracy and human rights outcomes. Thus, the trajectory I find among states facing 'democratic sanctions' can likely be attributed to these 'democratic sanctions' and not to any underlying similarities between countries facing sanctions onset in general. In other words, there seems to be something particular about 'democratic sanctions' that causes negative effects on democracy and human rights. This cannot be examined in greater detail given the sample sizes under examination here, but may be attributed to the type of domestic pressure 'democratic sanctions' entail [@earlyDoesMiseryLove2022: 4--5]. 'Democratic sanctions' often play out under precarious domestic circumstances, with autocrats clinging to power, civil society aiming to weaken that hold on power, and governments in turn cracking down on these dissidents. 'Democratic sanctions' pose a greater threat to an autocratic regime's survival than other types of sanctions do [see @escriba-folchDealingTyrannyInternational2010; @grauvogelClaimsLegitimacyCount2014; @grauvogelSanctionsSignalsHow2017; @lichtHazardsHasslesEffect2017; @liouRevisitingCausalLinks2020a; @meiLeadercontingentSanctionsCause2024 on mechanisms] As discussed, this greater risk also explains why autocrats only rarely 'fold' in the threat stage of democratic sanctions [@vonsoestAreDemocraticSanctions2015a: 961--962; Appendix \@ref(app-threats)].^[I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.]

*Second*, I ran a replication of the main analysis using temporal sub-samples splitting the 1990--2021 timeframe into pre- and post-2005 eras (1990--2004 and 2005--2021, respectively). Appendix \@ref(app-subset) presents these analyses. This takes up the turn from indiscriminate sanctions to more targeted measures dating to around 2005 (see Section \@ref(changes)). The results suggest that, if anything, the negative effects of 'democratic sanctions' may have worsened. Although targeted sanctions may have decreased broader humanitarian fallout as intended by the reforms of the 2000s, autocrats may nowadays react more harshly to 'democratic sanctions' than they once did, with democracy and human rights deteriorating as a result [e.g., @liouRevisitingCausalLinks2020a; @meiLeadercontingentSanctionsCause2024]. While it is not possible to closely probe the reasons for this dynamic here, it is nonetheless normatively concerning that the negative effects of this type of sanctions do not seem to have markedly improved.




# Conclusion {#conclusion}

Previous research has argued and shown that economic sanctions have historically had largely negative or mixed effects on human rights and democracy outcomes in sanctioned countries. However, this research mainly covers the Cold War and 1990s. Since then, policy innovations to replace indiscriminate embargoes have taken hold in sanctions practice, most prominently 'targeted' sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans. Given these significant changes, it stands to reason that democracy- and human rights-related sanctions may now indeed positively affect human rights and democracy (*H1* and *H2*) by more effectively pressuring political elites.

This article has presented a thorough re-analysis of this question for 1990--2021. It applies novel matching, weighting, and difference-in-differences analysis to new treatment and outcome data. In particular, this analysis uses past insights into dramatic trigger events as predictors of sanctions imposition. The results show that much of the pessimism surrounding sanctions continues to be warranted: Human rights- and democracy-related sanctions are estimated to have a marked negative effect on democracy outcomes for at least 3--4 years post-imposition (*H1*), and negative but less reliably estimated effects on human rights outcomes (*H2*). The type of analysis presented here cannot estimate the longer-term effects of sanctions due to timeframe and data limitations. However, these are worth exploring given the longer-term constraining goals sanctions often pursue [@giumelliCoercingConstrainingSignalling2011]. 

The mid-2000s reforms towards 'targeted sanctions' have therefore seemingly not solved the major problem of fallout caused by economic sanctions, particularly those intended to improve democracy and human rights. Taking these empirical results seriously means further investing in ways to minimize the civilian harm of sanctions. Sanctions of this sort must be carefully considered and crafted, must not be a knee-jerk reaction, and must be thoroughly implemented and monitored if decided upon. That said, populist and isolationist political trends in the US and some EU countries might suggest a further retreat from "more overt forms of democracy promotion" [@hydeDemocracyBackslidingInternational2020: 1193] and therefore less use of 'democratic sanctions' in the 2020s and beyond.

That said, the mechanisms through which economic sanctions -- even modern targeted sanctions -- elicit negative fallout remain underexplored. They may increase domestic protest [@grauvogelSanctionsSignalsHow2017] and decrease government revenues [@liouRevisitingCausalLinks2020a], in turn increasing repression and leading to poorer government services and greater corruption, respectively [@liouRevisitingCausalLinks2020a; see also @meiLeadercontingentSanctionsCause2024; @kangEconomicSanctionsRepression2023]. My exploratory analyses suggest that 'democratic sanctions' in particular elicit negative effects, while sanctions on other issues do not, and that these effects may have turned worse since 2005 (Section \@ref(robust), Appendices \@ref(app-placebo) and \@ref(app-subset)). Further probing these links lies beyond the scope of this paper, but would be worth exploring through case studies of the medium-*N* sample covered in the analysis presented here (Appendix \@ref(app-list)). For instance, such work could compare the potential differences in underlying mechanisms of targeted elite sanctions [e.g., @portelaDesignImpactsIndividual2022] and broader sectoral sanctions. A sender government cannot be made fully responsible for a target government deciding to repress its citizens following sanctions [@lopezMoreEthicalNot1999: 146]. However, as sanctions become an increasingly popular Western policy tool, they should be considered prudently as a "least bad choice" at best [@peksenPoliticalEffectivenessNegative2019: 286--287; @earlyStillUnjustJust2018; @earlyDoesMiseryLove2022].

Beyond its substantive contribution, this study has laid out and used a framework for replicating and extending past country-year IR research given innovations in causal inference methods for panel data [@imaiMatchingMethodsCausal2023] that can be readily applied to most country-year IR work. This answers the call for more replication studies in IR [@buenodemesquitaSymposiumReplicationInternational2003; @gleditschReplicationInternationalRelations2016], especially regarding highly policy-relevant research questions.




\pagebreak

# Bibliography {-}

<div id="refs"></div>



\pagebreak

\appendix
\renewcommand{\thesection}{A}

\setstretch{2.0}

\renewcommand{\thepage}{A\arabic{page}}
\setcounter{page}{1}

\setcounter{footnote}{0}

\counterwithin{figure}{section}
\counterwithin{table}{section}

# Online Appendix

## Trends in global democracy, human rights, and 'democratic sanctions' {#app-decline}

Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-03) illustrates the recent dual decline of democracy and human rights globally since the early 2010s, according to two central datasets on the topic, V-Dem and HRS. First, in 2022, mean electoral democracy across all countries stands at levels last seen in 2000 and 2001.^[Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Kyle L Marquardt, Juraj Medzihorsky, et al. (2024). “V-Dem Methodology (V14 – March 2024).” _V-Dem Working Paper_.] This trend is even more striking when considering the share of the world population experiencing this reversal. Particularly populous countries, such as India, Indonesia, and the US are notably declining in democracy measures.^[Alizada, Nazifa, Vanessa Alexandra Boese, Martin Lundstedt, Kelly Morrison, Natalia Natsika, Yuko Sato, Hugo Tai, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2022): _Autocratization Changing Nature?_  [`https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4052548`](https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4052548); pg. 10–11. Boese, Vanessa A., Martin Lundstedt, Kelly Morrison, Yuko Sato, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2022): “State of the World 2021: Autocratization Changing Its Nature?” _Democratization_ 29 (6), 983--1013.  [`https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751`](https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751).] Second, similarly to democracy, average human rights practices -- defined narrowly as physical integrity rights -- improved consistently from 1989 onwards but have in 2021 reversed to their 2009 level.^[Fariss, Christopher J. (2014): “Respect for Human Rights Has Improved over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability.” _American Political Science Review_ 108 (2): 297--318.  [`https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000070`](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000070). Fariss, Christopher J., Michael Kenwick, and Kevin Reuning (2020): “Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 4.” Harvard Dataverse.  [`https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RQ85GK`](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RQ85GK).]

This study focuses on Western economic sanctions as a tool for democracy and human rights promotion. Domestic political dynamics and citizen movements and external democracy promotion and support are two key paths for strengthening democracy at home and abroad. However, international efforts may backfire by paving the way for "strategic manipulation" on the part of autocrats,^[Beaulieu, Emily, and Susan D. Hyde (2009): “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts.” _Comparative Political Studies_ 42 (3): 392--415.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325571`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325571).] and by being used within an overarching hegemonic project on the part of powers such as the US.^[Wolff, Jonas, and Iris Wurm (2011): “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion: A Proposal for Theoretical Classification.” _Security Dialogue_ 42 (1): 77--96. [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610393551`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610393551); pg. 85--87. See also Robinson, William I. (1996): _Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony._ Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; pg. 4. Kurki, Milja (2010): “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion.” _International Studies Review_ 12 (3): 362--86.  [`https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00943.x`](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00943.x). Poppe, Annika Elena, Julia Leininger, and Jonas Wolff (2019): “Introduction: Negotiating the Promotion of Democracy.” _Democratization_ 26 (5): 759--76.  [`https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1593379`](https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1593379).] Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-Dem-Sanc) shows the number of states under democracy- or human rights related UN, EU, or US sanctions from 1990--2021.^[Attia, Hana, and Julia Grauvogel (2023): “International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset.” _Journal of Peace Research_ 60 (4): 709--19.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080`](https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080).] This shows that the pursuit of democracy and human rights through economic coercion has been a consistent goal of Western states in the post-Cold War era and has increased somewhat in recent years.

\pagebreak

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Fig-Dem-Sanc, fig.cap="Democracy- and human rights-related sanctions imposition, 1990--2021.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=8, fig.height=4.5}
```

```{r Fig-03, fig.cap="Human rights and democracy, 1989--2022.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=8, fig.height=5.5}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak

## Literature: sanctions, democracy, and human rights {#app-lit}

Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Lit) in the main text summarizes canonical studies in the sanctions literature that examine democracy and human rights outcomes. It breaks 18 separate studies down by treatment (type of sanction, dataset), outcome (concept of human rights and/or democracy, dataset), timeframe under study, and the direction of the estimated effect.

This list was compiled by drawing on three systematic reviews of the sanctions literature^[Peksen, Dursun (2019): “When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature.” _Defence and Peace Economics_ 30 (6): 635--47. [`https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250`](https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250). Peksen, Dursun (2021): “Economic Sanctions and Political Stability and Violence in Target Countries.” In: _Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions_, edited by Peter van Bergeijk, 187--201. Edward Elgar. [`https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102721.00016`](https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102721.00016). Demena, Binyam A, Alemayehu S Reta, Gabriela Benalcazar Jativa, Patrick B Kimararungu, and Peter AG van Bergeijk (2021): “Publication Bias of Economic Sanctions Research: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Trade Linkage, Duration and Prior Relations on Sanctions Success.” In: _Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions_, edited by Peter AG van Bergeijk, 125--50. Edward Elgar. [`https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102721.00012`](https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102721.00012).] and a Web of Science query for `sanctions AND (democracy OR human rights)`, and then reviewing and classifying the results manually. I include studies that examine the effects of sanctions on democracy and/or human rights using country-year data, rather than single-country analyses,^[Sejersen, Mikkel (2019): “Democratic Sanctions Meet Black Knight Support: Revisiting the Belarusian Case.” _Democratization_ 26 (3): 502--20. [`https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1551886`](https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1551886).] theory,^[Marinov, Nikolay, and Shmuel Nili (2015): “Sanctions and Democracy.” _International Interactions_ 41 (4): 765--78. [`https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1036723`](https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1036723).] or analyses of third countries.^[Peterson, Timothy M. (2014): “Taking the Cue: The Response to US Human Rights Sanctions against Third Parties.” _Conflict Management and Peace Science_ 31 (2): 145--67. [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213503432`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213503432). Clay, K. Chad (2018): “Threat by Example: Economic Sanctions and Global Respect for Human Rights.” _Journal of Global Security Studies_ 3 (2): 133--49. [`https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy006`](https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy006).]

The majority of studies in this literature examine human rights outcomes. The most common datasets used to operationalize the two outcomes of interest are PTS and CIRI for human rights, and Freedom House and Polity for democracy measures.^[Wood, Reed M., and Mark Gibney (2010): “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI.” _Human Rights Quarterly_ 32 (2): 367--400.  [`https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0152`](https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0152). Cingranelli, David L, and David L Richards (2010): “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project.” _Human Rights Quarterly_ 32 (2): 401--24. Freedom House (2022): “Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule.”  [`https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule`](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule). Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, Christian Davenport, and Keith Jaggers (2002): “Polity IV, 1800–1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen.” _Comparative Political Studies_ 35 (1): 40--45.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/001041400203500103`](https://doi.org/10.1177/001041400203500103).] HSE and TIES, which cover 1914--2000 and 1945--2005, are the most commonly-used sanctions datasets.^[Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, eds. (2009): _Economic Sanctions Reconsidered_. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi (2014): “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset.” _Conflict Management and Peace Science_ 31 (5): 541--58.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520379`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520379).] Most of the studies in the literature squarely focus on the 20^th^ century, as the column 'range' indicates and as necessitated by these main datasets. These features underscore the main point made in Section \@ref(review): Examining the crucial question of sanctions, democracy, and human rights using newer data, newer statistical techniques for observational data, and the most recent timeframe available is a highly worthwhile and necessary endeavor for both the academic study of sanctions and for practical sanctions policy.

\pagebreak

## Summary statistics {#app-stats}

Table \@ref(tab:tab-stats) presents summary statistics for the main substantive variables covered in this study's analysis. The column on 'coverage' shows how complete the data on the variable in question is. The variables describing discrete events -- sanctions imposition, coups, fraudulent elections, conflict onset -- are assumed to be complete in their datasets, so that all country-years without an instance of the event in question are coded as '0.' The column shows that the data is sufficiently complete and coverage for the 1990--2021 timeframe is good. The righthand column visualizes the distribution of the variable in question.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r tab-stats, results='asis', echo=FALSE, message=FALSE, warning=FALSE}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak

## Democracy and human rights as objectives of Western sanctions {#app-dem-hr}

Using IST data,^[Attia and Grauvogel (2023).] Table \@ref(tab:Tab-02) shows the coincidence of democracy and human rights improvement as Western sanctions objectives from 1990--2021. These goals are frequently pursued in parallel by senders: 62.2% of country-years faced with either are faced with both types of sanctions (542 of 870). The table also illustrates the overall frequency of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions put into country-year terms: 870 of 6.005 (14.5%) country-years between 1990 and 2021 featured this type of sanctions.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Tab-02}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak

## Threats of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions imposition {#app-threats}

Table \@ref(tab:Tab-credible) examines how often threats of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions are successful. If *threats* of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions are frequently successful, this would pose a significant challenge to analyzing the effects of such sanctions, because merely examining *imposed* sanctions of this type would omit numerous cases of successful threats. This follows the approach laid out by von Soest and Wahman.^[Soest, Christian von, and Michael Wahman (2015b): “Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?” _Democratization_ 22 (6): 957--80.  [`https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.888418`](https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.888418); pg. 961--962.] The table uses EUSANCT data because this dataset includes sanctions threats from 1989--2015 (unlike IST, which I use for all other analyses).^[Weber, Patrick M, and Gerald Schneider (2022): “Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset.” _Conflict Management and Peace Science_ 39 (1): 97--114.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729).] The table's rows show three different sanctions objectives: improving democracy, improving human rights, and all other sanctions objectives. The column 'Threat successful' shows the share of cases in which a sanctions threat was issued and the target state acquiesced to the sender's demands before sanctions imposition. 'Threat credible' calculates how often threats were issued, the target did not acquiesce, and the sender then indeed imposed the threatened sanctions, thus making the initial threat credible. Finally, 'Threat not credible' shows the share of sanctions threats that were ultimately not backed up by the sender.

These calculations support von Soest and Wahman's key point that the threat stage of human rights- and democracy-related sanctions is not in fact particularly important, in that targets quite rarely 'fold' at this stage. Only about one in nine such threats is successful (11 of 93; 11.7%), likely because concessions by authoritarian regimes to democracy- and human rights-related demands are particularly costly for the target and conceding early on these points makes dictators more likely to be held accountable and relinquish power.^[von Soest and Wahman (2015b); pg. 961--962.] Conversely, 45% of all other sanctions threats are successful, an effect also known as the "hidden hand of economic coercion."^[Nooruddin, Irfan (2002): “Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy.” _International Interactions_ 28 (1): 59--75.  [`https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394`](https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394). Drezner, Daniel W. (2003): “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” _International Organization_ 57 (3): 643--59.  [`https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052`](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052).] Therefore, while important for analyzing other types of economic sanctions and their effectiveness, the threat stage can be bracketed here when analyzing democracy- and human rights-related sanctions.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Tab-credible}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak

## Success rates of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions imposition {#app-success}

Having established that democracy- and human rights-related *threats* are rarely successful, are *imposed* sanctions of this sort deemed to be any more successful, descriptively? Table \@ref(tab:Tab-success-1) shows the number of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions impositions between 1989 and 2015 using EUSANCT, as in the preceding Appendix (\@ref(app-threats)). 'Success' is here defined as partial or total target acquiescence.^[Weber and Schneider (2022).] This indicates that the majority of 'democratic sanctions' indeed end with the target making notable concessions, both in total (59%) and for democracy- (68.4%) and human rights-related sanctions (56.8%) individually. This surface-level breakdown implies that 'democratic sanctions' may be more useful than their reputation suggests. That said, this sort of sanctions seems to have been more successful in the pre-targeted sanctions era (1989--2004; 66.2%) compared to the targeted sanctions era (since 2005; 45.7%).

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Tab-success-1}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak

## Treatment variation: How common are 'democratic sanctions'? {#app-treat-var}

How common are democracy- and human rights-related sanctions? Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-04) illustrates the treatment variation within the analyzed sample. Gray tiles show country-years for which sanctions data is complete and which did not face democracy- or human rights-related sanctions. Black tiles represent country-years with this type of sanctions imposed, i.e., treated units. A group of six countries (Myanmar, Cuba, Iran, China, North Korea, Somalia) was sanctioned for the entire timeframe, thus being dropped from the analysis because no change in treatment status can be observed and they cannot be used as control units. At least one treatment onset can be observed for a total of 63 countries (of 181; 34.8%) -- ranging from Sudan, which was sanctioned in 31 of 32 observed years, to Malawi, which was sanctioned in one of 32 years. Finally, 110 countries (60.8% of the sample) were never sanctioned. Furthermore, there are no obvious temporal clusters in Western sanctions practice. This shows the range of treatment variation necessary to usefully apply `PanelMatch`.^[Imai, Kosuke, In Song Kim, and Erik Wang (2023): “Matching Methods for Causal Inference with Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data.” _American Journal of Political Science_ 67 (3): 587--605.  [`https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12685`](https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12685); pg. 591--592.]

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Fig-04, fig.cap="Treatment variation plot: democracy- and human rights-related sanctions by the UN, EU, or US, 1990--2021.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=8, fig.height=4}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak






## Robustness test: excluding UN sanctions {#app-un-sanc}

This appendix replicates the results of the main analysis while excluding UN sanctions. In the main analysis, UN sanctions are included as 'Western-supported' sanctions in the sense that they must by definition be supported or tolerated by the US, UK, and France in order to be passed as Security Council resolution. However, many studies in the 'democratic sanctions' literature examine only unilateral Western sanctions (i.e., US and/or EU sanctions; recall Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Lit)). These replications probe whether the main results are dependent on UN sanctions. Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-UN-sanc-1) estimates the effects on US and EU sanctions on democracy. Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-UN-sanc-2) estimates the effects on US and EU sanctions on human rights. Because UN sanctions are most commonly imposed alongside US and EU sanctions and because democracy and human rights are only rarely the main goals of UN sanctions [@bierstekerThinkingUnitedNations2016a: 24], excluding them only slightly changes the overall sample size. However, it does shift the years of sanctions onset for several cases. Nonetheless, the main results and these replications are virtually the same.

\pagebreak

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Fig-UN-sanc-1, fig.cap="Estimated effect of democratic sanctions on democracy, excluding UN sanctions, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.75}
```

```{r Fig-UN-sanc-2, fig.cap="Estimated effect of democratic sanctions on human rights, excluding UN sanctions, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.75}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak






## Coups, fraudulent elections, and sanctions imposition {#app-trig-desc}

How commonly are coups and fraudulent elections met with sanctions imposition? Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-01) plots all country-year observations of coups and fraudulent elections and whether sanctions were newly imposed in the same year.^[Chin, John J., David B Carter, and Joseph G Wright (2021): “The Varieties of Coups D’état: Introducing the Colpus Dataset.” _International Studies Quarterly_ 65 (4): 1040--51.  [`https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab058`](https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab058). Chin, John J., and Jessica Kirkpatrick (2023): “African Coups in the COVID-19 Era: A Current History.” _Frontiers in Political Science_ 5.  [`https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1077945`](https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1077945). Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov (2012): “Which Elections Can Be Lost?” _Political Analysis_ 20 (2): 191--210.  [`https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr040`](https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr040). Coppedge et al. (2024). The data censors out observations that already have such sanctions imposed on them. E.g., although Egypt held fraudulent elections in 2018, the country was already under US human rights- and democracy-related sanctions since 2012 and 2014. Therefore, new sanctions onset is not possible and the observation is dropped.] The lefthand panel shows that sanctions remain a common reaction to coups. The righthand panel illustrates that while from 1990--2004, one in eleven controversial elections was met with 'democratic sanctions,' only one in fifty has since 2005. Descriptively, while used as reactions to controversial elections in the early 1990s, this is rare today. This perhaps suggests an increasing sensitivity of international election monitors to fraud, but a decreasing Western willingness to sanctions such fraud. This descriptive result is likely also driven by the fact that -- as Western sanctions have continuously expanded (see Section \@ref(changes)) -- more countries in which fraudulent elections are held today are already under under Western sanctions in the first place, omitting them from this figure. All that said, country-years with fraudulent elections remain more likely to be sanctioned than country-years without such elections (Section \@ref(predict)). Other plausible trigger events include unconstitutional extensions of term limits, violent crackdowns on peaceful protests, or the detention of prominent and internationally visible dissidents, but these cannot be covered here.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Fig-01, fig.cap="Coups, controversial elections, and the imposition of democracy- and human right-related sanctions, 1990--2021.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=11, fig.height=5.5}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak



## Replication and extension of von Soest and Wahman (2015a) {#app-repli}

Table \@ref(tab:Tab-03) replicates and extends von Soest and Wahman's analysis of when 'democratic sanctions' are imposed. Specifically, this replicates Table 3 in their study in two steps.^[Soest, Christian von, and Michael Wahman (2015a): “Not All Dictators Are Equal: Coups, Fraudulent Elections, and the Selective Targeting of Democratic Sanctions.” _Journal of Peace Research_ 52 (1): 17--31.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314551081`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314551081); pg. 27.] First, it presents logit and rare events logit models for the 1990--2010 timeframe they analyze in their study. Second, this timeframe is extended to the 1990--2021 period analyzed in this study. Their results hold for 1990--2010 and with the reconstructed dataset used in the present study; coups retain their strong predictive power, as do controversial elections and political proximity to Western states. GDP per capita and FDI have similar effects as in the original study. These results also largely hold for 1990--2021, giving confidence in both the original analysis and the dataset constructed for the purpose of the present study.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Tab-03}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak


## Trade as a potential further confounder {#app-trade}

Table \@ref(tab:Tab-Trade) probes whether trade linkages with Western states make 'democratic sanctions' imposition more or less likely. Due to data limitations, the examined timeframe stretches from 1990--2014, rather than from 1990--2021, as the main analyses do. For the sake of keeping the main analyses as simple as possible and to keep the examined timeframe consistent, these additional results are presented in this appendix.

Trade linkages have been shown to affect sanctions imposition, with more vulnerable and dependent countries generally more likely to be sanctioned^[Peksen, Dursun, and Timothy M. Peterson (2016): “Sanctions and Alternate Markets: How Trade and Alliances Affect the Onset of Economic Coercion.” _Political Research Quarterly_ 69 (1): 4–-16. [`https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915620049`](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915620049). Peterson, Timothy M. (2020): “Reconsidering Economic Leverage and Vulnerability: Trade Ties, Sanction Threats, and the Success of Economic Coercion.” _Conflict Management and Peace Science_ 37 (4): 409-–29. [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218797024`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218797024).] and more likely to concede once sanctions are imposed.^[Whang, Taehee (2010): “Structural Estimation of Economic Sanctions: From Initiation to Outcomes.” _Journal of Peace Research_ 47 (5): 561–-73. [`https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343310376868`](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343310376868).
]. At the same, a high share of trade with Western states might plausibly also facilitate improvements to democracy and human rights, i.e., the outcomes we are interested in. Therefore, trade linkage is a potential confounder of the causal relationship we are interested in. That said, trade linkages have received less attention in the literature that focuses on 'democratic sanctions' more specifically.

Trade data is drawn from the Correlates of War trade dataset, which uses current US dollars as of its date of publication, 2017.^[Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M.G. Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins (2009): “Trading Data: Evaluating Our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” _Conflict Management and Peace Science_ 26 (5): 471-–91. [`https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894209343887`](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894209343887).] I add up imports and exports to and from the US and all EU-28 states. Given EU expansion over the period of analysis, this somewhat simplifies the narrowly relevant trade volumes, but the largest European economies were EU members throughout the examined period. The sum of these imports and exports is then divided by the World Bank GDP data used in the main analyses (which uses 2015 US dollars). This calculates a country's dependence on trade with the EU and US. This dependence ranges from highly dependent states at 50--80% (e.g., Republic of Congo, Gabon, Tunisia in the 2000s) to quite independent ones at 0--1% (e.g., Turkmenistan and Bhutan in the 1990s).

The results for trade (highlighted in grey) indicate that there is no linear relationship between trade dependence on the West and democracy- and human rights-related sanctions onset. Therefore, trade dependence is likely not a confounder in the imposition/outcome relationship we are interested in and will not be covered in the main analyses.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Tab-Trade}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak





## Included cases of sanctions onset {#app-list}

Table \@ref(tab:app-tab-list) lists all instances of 'democratic sanctions' onset included in the study's main analysis, a total of *n* = 60 observations. Note that observations with onset in 1990--92 and 2019--21 are mainly dropped due to data availability or insufficient lag times for matching and weighting (t--4 through t--1/t0), and lead times for matching and effect estimation (t0 through t+3), respectively. Some other instances of sanctions onset -- largely in the 1990s -- are dropped due to missing data (Appendix \@ref(app-stats)). Finally, as discussed in Appendix \@ref(app-treat-var), states who have been sanctioned continuously or near-continuously do not feature in the analysis, as either sanctions onset cannot be observed, or because there are no exact matches on treatment history. Note that there are concerns around samples of roughly this size in staggered difference-in-differences analysis.^[Egerod, Benjamin, and Florian M Hollenbach (2024): “How Many Is Enough? Sample Size in Staggered Difference-in-Differences Designs.” [`https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/ac5ru`](https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/ac5ru).] However, Imai et al. themselves present two analyses with similar sample sizes, at $n = 26$ and $n = 103$ matched sets.^[Imai, Kim, and Wang (2023).] See also footnote 14 in the main text.

These data constraints explain the difference between the overall total of $N = 86$ instances of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions onset in the timeframe and this final number of $n = 60$ cases covered in the analysis. The table gives the reader an impression of the 'type' of country under examination in this study: The shown countries are largely autocracies, though not autocracies that have been sanctioned continuously. This temporal distribution also shows that the majority of cases are drawn from the 21^st^ century, in line with the study's research interest and title.

```{r app-tab-list}
```

\pagebreak



## `PanelMatch` illustration: Burundi 2015 {#app-illu}

Table \@ref(tab:Tab-05) illustrates the matching and weighting procedure used in `PanelMatch`^[Imai, Kim, and Wang (2023).] for a single example case of sanctions imposition: the imposition of sanctions against Burundi in 2015. The table shows that the procedure acts as expected: The countries assigned the greatest weight are similar to Burundi on the four key confounders identified in Section \@ref(treatment-assign) (i.e., trigger events, civil war onset, protest, and political proximity to the West). For the sake of simplicity, the table shows the averages of the two years before sanctions imposition on Burundi (2013 and 2014 for protest and political proximity) and the averages of the year of imposition and one year before for the events variables (i.e., trigger events and civil war onset; 2014 and 2015).

The countries most similar to Burundi on these confounders are Ethiopia (16% of all weights applied), Nigeria (14%), and Azerbaijan (10%). Conversely, very different countries on these factors -- Norway, Georgia. Iceland -- are assigned the least weight. The similarity on pre-treatment outcomes shown in the righthand columns (which are not used for weighting) also supports the parallel trends assumption (see Section \@ref(results)).

Figure \@ref(fig:Fig-BDI-2015) illustrates these three closest matches and important parts of `PanelMatch` as applied to the data at hand. It shows the three countries making up about 40% of the weight within the control group constructed for the treated (i.e., sanctioned) case of Burundi in 2015: Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Azerbaijan (Table \@ref(tab:Tab-05)). The Y axis shows these four countries' level of democracy from 1989--2021. Each country's line also indicates whether the country faced democracy- or human rights- related sanctions at any given year in this timeframe, which all four indeed did at some point. The lag and lead windows for the case of Burundi in 2015 is highlighted in dark grey; this is the timeframe that is relevant for the exact matching, weighting, and difference-in-differences estimation used in `PanelMatch` with this study's specifications. The lag period is used for matching on treatment history and weighting on relevant covariates. The lead period is used to estimate the ATT. Regarding Table \@ref(tab:Tab-05), note that weights are assigned not only on the four covariates in 2015 (shown here for simplicity) but for the entire lag window.

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Fig-BDI-2015, fig.cap="Illustration: Burundi 2015 and its three closest matches.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=4}
```

```{r Tab-05}
```

\setstretch{2.0}

\pagebreak


## Placebo tests {#app-placebo}

The following placebo tests examine sanctions not related to democracy or human rights. They start with two of the four confounders used in the main analyses: increases in intrastate conflict and political proximity and drop the pro-democracy protest and trigger event variables, because these are not theoretically expected to affect the imposition of sanctions unrelated to democracy and human rights. Among the _n_ = 28 matched cases of this type of sanctions imposition, there are no cases of increases in civil war, so this variable is ultimately also not used. Thus, the types of countries under examination are sanctioned and do not face increases in domestic conflict. They include cases of sanctions imposition such as Guyana in 2001 (US sanctions over the repatriation of foreign nationals), Bulgaria in 2008 (EU sanctions surrounding corruption and pre-accession EU funding), and Azerbaijan in 2017 (US sanctions over Azerbaijan's relations with Armenia, known as "Section 907"). See the IST dataset for more complete descriptions of these cases.^[Attia and Grauvogel (2023).] Otherwise, the `PanelMatch` specifications are identical (e.g., on leads and lags).

Table \@ref(tab:app-placebo-dem-bal) shows the balance of treated and control cases once weighted. Treated and control units are sufficiently balanced on political proximity. The pre-treatment trends on the outcome variables (which are not used for weighting) also run in parallel. Using this matching and weighting, Figure \@ref(fig:app-placebo-dem) shows the effects of sanctions unrelated to democracy and human rights on democracy. Figure \@ref(fig:app-placebo-hr) shows the effects on human rights. Both results indicate that these types of sanctions do not negatively affect democracy and human rights outcomes in sanctioned countries. This suggests that it is not sanctions as such that are driving this study's main estimates, but rather 'democratic sanctions' specifically.

\pagebreak

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r app-placebo-dem-bal}
```

```{r app-placebo-dem, fig.cap="Placebo test: the effects of sanctions unrelated to democracy and human rights on democracy.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.65}
```

```{r app-placebo-hr, fig.cap="Placebo test: the effects of sanctions unrelated to democracy and human rights on human rights.", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.65}
```

\pagebreak

\setstretch{2.0}


## Subset analyses: 1990--2004 and 2005--2021 {#app-subset}

How might the estimated effects of democracy- and human rights-related sanctions on democracy and human rights have changed since the advent of targeted sanctions in the early 2000s (Section \@ref(changes))? I apply the estimation strategy used in this paper to two temporal subsets of the full timeframe: 1990--2004 and 2005--2021. Given these shorter timeframes than in the main analysis, I also shorten the lag timeframe to _L_ = 1 (i.e., the pre-treatment timeframe on which treatment history is matched and for which matches are weighted). For the sake of brevity, I only report results for the democracy outcome in the following.

Tables \@ref(tab:subsets-Dem-bal-90-04) and \@ref(tab:subsets-Dem-bal-05-21) show that treatment and control groups are well-balanced in both the 1990--2004 and 2005--2021 timeframe across all four confounders used in the analyses. Figures \@ref(fig:subsets-Dem-90-04) and \@ref(fig:subsets-Dem-05-21) show the ATT estimates for these two timeframes. These timeframes include *n* = 35 and *n* = 30 cases of sanctions imposition, respectively. If anything, these separate analyses indicate that the negative effects of 'democratic sanctions' seem to have turned stronger in more recent years, after the turn to 'targeted sanctions' and the more sophisticated sanctions policies and implementation around 2005. Although targeted sanctions may have decreased humanitarian fallout as intended, autocrats may nowadays react more harshly to 'democratic sanctions' than they previously did.^[On mechanisms, see, e.g., Liou, Ryan Yu-Lin, Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen (2020): “Revisiting the Causal Links between Economic Sanctions and Human Rights Violations.” _Political Research Quarterly_, 74 (4): 808--821.  [`https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920941596`](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920941596).] These results are further discussed in the main text and especially in the conclusion (Section \@ref(conclusion)).

\pagebreak

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r subsets-Dem-bal-90-04}
```

```{r subsets-Dem-90-04, fig.cap="Estimated effect of democratic sanctions on democracy, 1990--2004 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.45}
```

```{r subsets-Dem-bal-05-21}
```

```{r subsets-Dem-05-21, fig.cap="Estimated effect of democratic sanctions on democracy, 2005--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.45}
```

\setstretch{2.0}




\pagebreak

## Subset analyses: separating democracy and human rights {#app-sep-aims}

The main analysis combines democracy- and human rights-related sanctions regimes into the single category of 'democratic sanctions,' i.e., democracy- and/or human rights-related sanctions. Although there is significant overlap between both aims (recall Appendix \@ref(app-dem-hr)), it is worthwhile to analyze sanctions with each aim individually in order to ascertain whether one might have significantly more negative effects than the other.

Figures \@ref(fig:Fig-sdod)--\@ref(fig:Fig-shoh) separate out the two aims (democracy- or human rights related sanctions) and outcomes (democracy or human rights), estimating the four possible combinations of treatments and outcomes.

Democracy-related sanctions have a more negative effects on *democracy outcomes* than human rights-related sanctions do. This is in line with the empirical observation that cases of democracy-related sanctions imposition are often more severe, as they pose a greater threat to target regime survival than many human rights-related sanctions do. For instance, sanctions aiming at achieving free and fair elections but a targeted regime at greater risk of replacement than sanctions calling for the release of specific political prisoners do. Thus, target governments may well respond more repressively when faced with a greater threat to their survival. Meanwhile, human rights- and democracy-related sanctions have equally negative effects on *human rights outcomes*, though those of human rights-related sanctions are somewhat more precisely estimated.

The main caveat here is that these sanctions -- taken individually -- may plausibly have somewhat different treatment assignment mechanisms than 'democratic sanctions' as a whole. The literature around ‘democratic sanctions’ bundles both aims together,^[E.g., von Soest and Wahman 2015, which I closely build on.] examining the joint treatment assignment mechanism. For the sake of simplicity and comparability, I apply the same `PanelMatch` procedure to these four separate exploratory analyses as I do to the joint analyses in the main text. However, further work might probe whether other covariates (e.g., trigger events beyond fraudulent elections and coups) are relevant for these treatment assignment mechanisms. Also note that these analyses do not account for whether the other type of sanction is also in place. As Appendix \@ref(app-dem-hr) shows, they often coincide.

\pagebreak

\setstretch{1.3}

```{r Fig-sdod, fig.cap="The effect of democracy-related sanctions on democracy outcomes, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.75}
```

```{r Fig-sdoh, fig.cap="The effect of democracy-related sanctions on human rights outcomes, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.75}
```

\pagebreak

```{r Fig-shod, fig.cap="The effect of human rights-related sanctions on democracy outcomes, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.75}
```

```{r Fig-shoh, fig.cap="The effect of human rights-related sanctions on human rights outcomes, 1990--2021 (95\\% CIs).", fig.align = 'center', fig.width=7, fig.height=2.75}
```